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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an intriguing trend worldwide as it allows any
device to create and participate in a highly immersive and connected environment that
integrates physical, digital and social aspects of the users and reacts according to the user
requirements. The success of an IoT application depends on howwell it fulfills certain design
considerations like reliability, quality of service, security,scalability of the applications,
among which security issues gain more importance in real world because the exposure of
vulnerabilities in IoT applications can have serious consequences and it is important to set up
improved mechanisms for assuring security. The perpetual growth in the number of devices
tends to create more vulnerabilities if these devices are not authenticated before the device
communicates critical data with the servers. However, designing a security mechanism for
IoT is a challenging task due to the resource-constrained nature of the underlying sensor
elements in the network.
In this thesis, a need for authentication of the devices in perception layer of the IoT
architecture is discussed. A centralized network model is considered where the devices in
the perception layer are mutually authenticated with the gateway of the system using their
credentials. A secure and lightweight mutual authentication mechanism using symmetric
key negotiation using a variant of Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC), Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) is proposed in the device registration phase of the protocol to protect
the credentials of the devices with lesser key size itself and also to minimize the computation
cost of devices. At the end of the authentication, key agreement based on the symmetric key
cryptography is established between the sensor devices and the gateway so that further the
devices can carry out data collection and acquisition tasks securely and efficiently without
any attacks from adversary. Further, Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
method is used to avoid the possibility of man-in-the-middle attack in the initial phase of the
protocol and the results are recorded. The performance evaluation with the existing schemes
based on the execution time and computation cost at the device has been performed after the
protocol is simulated in the Cooja simulator under Contiki OS environment. The comparison
results show that the proposed system provides low computation cost and satisfies the
necessary security requirements.
Keywords: Internet of Things; Security; Lightweight Authentication; Elliptic Curve
Cryptography; ECDH; ECIES.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Internet of Things concept is growing quite popular which is all about control and
automation, reducing expenses, efficient communication of the things which are connected
to internet. The things in this context refer to the heterogeneous power constrained devices
with inbuilt RFID’s, sensors, actuators, or any smart communication interfaces[1]. A device
is a part of a thing and it can be a sensor or actuator or it can be a tag. The tasks of the things
include collecting contextual information from devices and send the processed information
to the other devices. Furthermore, the thing can pass actions to actuators[2]. A thing can not
only be a car or a watch but can also be abstracted to a home or a city depending on the use
case scenario.These things with unique IP address are able to communicate with each other
to perform certain tasks with minimal human involvement to lessen the burden of the users.
However, these IoT devices mostly follow wireless communication which raises curtain
for various security challenges which are related to wireless sensor networks[2, 3]. The
problem of node authentication in the network is always a concern in wireless sensor
networks. In case of IoT, whenever a device initiates the communication, be it data
collection, data aggregation, there is a possibility for the intrusion of attackers in the form of
eavesdropping or impersonating the device. This will not only provide the attacker, access
to the critical data of the communication but also the ability to modify the settings of the
devices. For example, the lack of authentication in the body area networks used in health care
applications of IoT, results in the intrusion of adversaries in the form of invalid devices which
can be capable of issuing false instructions to the patient’s devices causing severe damage
to their health[4]. Mostly these devices are susceptible to different security attacks like
impersonation, replay attacks which brings up the imperative need for a security mechanism
which checks the authenticity of the devices before the data collection and data acquisition
tasks[5, 6]. Besides, these IoT devices possess limited memory and processing power[7],
which causes draining of resources which brings the necessity for these secure cryptographic
protocols to be lightweight protocols as well in order to reduce the computation overhead
and prolong their lifetime[8].
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There are different authentication models for different network environments. In this
thesis, the proposed device authentication mechanisms are lightweight in nature which
achieves mutual authentication as well as key agreement using symmetric key negotiation
and asymmetric cryptography. These protocols are devised for the authentication between
IoT devices and the gateway of the network.
1.1.1 Architecture of IoT
There are various architectures for Internet of Things proposed by the researchers such
as 3-layered,4-layered,5-layered architectures. However, all these different architectures
essentially define the three functionalities of IoT like perception,transmission and processing
[9].
Figure 1.1: 3-layered Architecture of Internet of Things
2
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Perception Layer
Perception Layer of IoT is the layer which describes about the heterogenous things of IoT
such as sensors, RFID’s, actuators, mobile phones. The main function of this layer is to
acquire, collect and process the data from perception devices such as RFID’s, temperature
and humidity sensors, wearables and also control the actuators such as heater, fan[10]. This
layer is responsible for transforming the information collected from sensors into digital
signals to forward to the upper network layer.
Types of Things ”Things” in the Internet of Things can be classified into following
categories[11]:
1. Tagging things: The objects like RFID’s are categorized as tagging things.
2. Sensing things: The objects like sensors present in wireless sensor networks are
categorized as sensing things.
3. Shrink things: The objects like nano materials, nano processors of nano technology
can be categorized as shrink things.
Sensing things are the category of devices that are being used in the following sections.
Network Layer
The main function of network layer is to transmit and process the information collected
by sensors of the perception layer[9]. The network layer includes communication network
technologies, information and intelligent processing center. This layer will send the digital
signals received from the perception layer to the upper layers using one among the various
communication networks such as WLAN, mobile adhoc network etc. All these components
of the network layer are meant to be robust enough to meet the requirements like addressing,
resource management, network integration.
Application Layer
The Application Layer acts like an interface between other layers and the users[12]. The
main task of this layer is to integrate the lower layer functionalities and create a practical
platform for all types of scenarios, such as the environmental monitoring, intelligent
transportation, medical and health monitoring, home automation. This layer provides the
required services to the customers. For example, the queries like measurements of the
temperature, humidity parameters are sent back to the customer who needs that data. The
significance of this layer is to able to provide exceptional quality services as per the customer
queries. This layer includes numerous varieties of applications like smart buildings, smart
cities and homes etc.[13].
3
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1.2 Key Principles and Elements of IoT
The key point of IoT can be summarized as follows[14] :
• Four important underlying technology fields that lay foundation for IoT are the
sensors,addressing,networks,distributed identification
• Three types of communication such as thing to person, person to person, thing to thing
are possible.
• The large quantities of data accumulated from the heterogeneous sdeviceswhich is
processed further will be increasing in volume day by day.
• Most of the communications will occur automatically, devices will have the ability to
decide to exchange data within their environment and more likely without the actual
user’s knowledge.
• There exists context awareness among the devices and their heterogeneity provides
quite large number of functionalities in different domains.
The following are the key elements of the IoT Technology:
IoT is a complete technology ensemble which includes various categories like the device
technology to sense the real world data, data transfer technology to commute this data to
different devices spread across the confined area, the intelligent process technology to merge
and process the loads of data into real world applications.
Figure 1.2: Technologies of Internet of Things
1. Device Technology:
The first technology ruling the IoT world is the sensor and actuator technology. This part
acts as the enabler for gathering of data by various means such as sensors,tags. RFID is one
4
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among the wide range of available device technologies. They are capable of detecting the
movements of fast-moving objects using the embedded tags.
Besides this, another driving force for data collection is the sensor technology which
are inserted into the devices to help in the transformation of the physical world objects into
the smart objects. The sensing unit and the power unit present in the sensor device are
the building blocks of the smart object. They help to find the signals around the devices
and act accordingly. The actuator unit is incorporated in the same unit of sensor which is
responsible for the transformation of energy into sensor movements.
2. Communication Technology:
In order to enable the successful communication among the device technologies, there
is always a imperative requirement for the communication protocols. As far as the types of
technologies for communication are concerned, there are two varieties such as the wired and
wireless. The wired
Figure 1.3: Communication Protocols Stack of Internet of Things
In case of IoT, the most crucial technology used for communication among the sensing
devices are the wireless protocols. They act as a bridge between the device technology and
the processing aspect of IoT. This wireless sensor networks impart the necessary perception
ability to IoT. The following figure shows the communication stack of IoT protocols.
3. Processing Technology:
The enormous loads of data from the perception layer tags and sensor devices is usually
very difficult to process with the traditional technologies. Hence an improved intelligent
processing technology such as a data manager collaborated with cloud is used for this
purpose. This technology automates the process of dividing the loads of data into different
chunks for making the processing and storage steps easier. The distributed nature of the
cloud acts as an ensemble of many programs to handle the enormous data communication.
5
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1.1.3 Applications
IoT is a vast area growing in every possible direction with a vast variety of applications
in diverse domains. The IoT applications can be segregated into different categories based
on several factors like type of network availability, scalability, heterogeneity of the things,
degree of automation and impact[15]. We can divide the wide range of applications into the
following groups:
Figure 1.4: Applications of Internet of Things
Personal and home
In personal domain category, information from the perception layer is collected and this
data is used only by the users who directly own the network. Ubiquitous healthcare[16] is yet
another platform which is depicts the essence of IoT with the help of body area sensors. The
day-to-day devices such as smartphone is a perfect media to control the communication with
the help of other interfaces such as bluetooth to connect the sensors to find the measurements
of various parameters.
The automation employed in home appliances such as fridge, washing machine delivers
a better power management and their efficiency.
Enterprise
The enterprise applications are supposed to be defined as IoT enforced within work
environment. The external information received by the network is accessed by the sole
6
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owners of the enterprises. Once the data is collected, the broadcast of this data into the real
world is performed by them. This is usually observed in case of agriculture and also to keep
the count of tenants in the buildings in case of environmental monitoring.
The significant area of IoT applications is the Smart Environment IoT[17]. The
applications of urban environment can gain benefits from the creation of a smart city with
the usage of WSN. They include areas such as health, transport and mobility.
Utilities
Unlike other application domains, the data obtained from the outside world is used for
improvement of services. The users who avail this facility include the smart electricity
supply firms who strive to improve the trade-off between cost and profit. In order to manage
the vital utilities and resources efficiently, an extensive group of networks is used to create
their networks. Smart grid, metering is another wide domain of IoT which has popularity all
over the world[18]. This works based on the information collected at the city and it is used
for reaching the specified quality of service with the load balancing.
One of the popular utilities of IoT is monitoring the network of water and its quality.
Many sensors are integrated into the localities in order to calculate the required parameters
to ensure more quality in supply is achieved by eliminating the problems of spoiling
drinking water, wastage disposal. The similar network is followed in agriculture utility as
well to make decisions about soil quality and related parameters[15].
Mobile
Smart logistics and transportation are another potential application in this domain. The
pollution created by the whole urban traffic has become a major concern in most of the
cities. To avoid this condition, the traffic management should be transformed dynamically.
For this, IoT can be used to design online traffic monitoring using wider WSNs. Based on
the captured information, only relevant data is broadcasted to the travelers.
Yet another widely used application is the bluetooth which is mostly used in numerous
products like hand sets, smart phones etc. The sensors used in bluetooth are able to read
the signals emitted by the devices in close proximity. However, there prevail huge privacy
issues related to this usage. Digital forgetting is one evolving area to be studied where the
main concern is privacy.[17]
Themajor share of themobile domain is occupied by the logistics category. The activities
involved in this domain are checking the levels of efficiency in transport along with its
planning. This is mainly achieved by using an IoT network to large extent.[19].
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1.2 Research Challenges in IoT
Despite the enormous applications, IoT has certain challenging areas which needed to be
focused. The research challenges of IoT can be summarized as[20–22]:
Figure 1.5: Challenges of Internet of Things
Privacy
The soaring number of devices in the IoT technology is the reason for privacy issues to
become more prevalent. In order to improve the usage and levels of comfort of the users of
IoT, it is vital not only to secure the data but also to solve the ownership issues regarding the
data privacy.
Thus, whenever the data is collected, it is the main task to assign the ownership
very clearly. By doing this, it is ensured that a barrier has been set on the permissions
to use the data that is being shared which can be managed only by the owner. All the
objects are capable of having their own privacy rules which are used by each other while
communicating over the internet. [23].
Security
It is very essential for the IoT technology to provide security as per the demand such as
Intranet wise, data wise, software and hardware wise as well as for the physical aspects.[21].
Communication in Internet is typically secured by carrying ot encryption over the channel.
This is the possible way to promise the security of the data in IoT. However, the vey
low resource capacity of IoT doesn’t completely have the facility to support the complex
operations. Hene, focus is put on reducing the complex nature of this encryption so that they
are able to provide better efficiency and key management. [2, 24]
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The current resource-constrained nature of the IoT resembles the sensors in WSNs in
terms of communication, the available wireless channels, the ability to process the huge
data, attack prone features. All these elements make it more difficult to enforce secure
services for the things in IoT. The reasons behind these difficulties being the heterogeneity
and the insecure environment where these devices have been deployed. Also, the global
accessibility for these devices is provided using various protocols like RPL, CoAP over the
wireless links in the communication.
Reliability
The degree of unreliability and uncertainty introduced in IoT environments following
the real-world dynamics, makes such environments error prone. Enhancing the reliability of
the devices and the data requires new strategies for managing them and providing ireliability
patterns within IoT environments. Such strategies refer to methods for identifying reliability
and reputation patterns for the things, the quality of information.Mechanisms are required
that will enable the dynamic linkage between things and their attributes.
Trust and Ownership
The design of the infrastructure incorporated in the IoT helps to carry out communication
between various hosts, end-to-end systems along with the intermediate parties. This raises
the concern for the need of trust on both sides of communicating parties. In this case, this
trust should be established not only between devices but also in the protocols being used
by these entities. During this course, the factor of ownership also comes into picture which
defines how one device is relying on another while performing the necessary commands
and dedicated tasks. [21].
Scalability
There is every possibility in IoT to face the challenge of scalability. Because of the
pace at which the growth of the IoT devices such as sensors etc is the cause for the growth
in the accumulation of the data from them tremendously[21]. The ways to expand the
IoT environment are by ensuring the lifetime of the devices, their security. Thus handling
scalable issues hugely depends on the number of entities in the network and the information
produced by them. [25].
Standardization and Interoperability
Any practical application of IoT is the combination of mainly different actors like things
and users in the infrastructure. Accordingly, the responsibilities of these elements also
vary depending on the type of application such as aggregation, collection etc. The main
contribution of these actors towards IoT is how well they interact with each other. Thus
the standards as well as the interactions play an eminent role to achieve the communication
9
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goals of IoT.[25].
Identity Management
The process of integrating the zillions of objects into the IoT environment and the
maintenance of the details of those devices is a tedious task. The way these things are
provided with address requires the quality of uniqueness which is another task to be taken
care of accordingly. There are several vital technologies like the smart cards, pins, tags
etc. are considered as a means to address the devices in the IoT[7]. Hence, the task of
providing identities has gained so much importance in most of the security frameworks in
IoT. Because they help to find out the fraud activities in institutions, organizations. Thus,
identity management ensures that these smart entities are who they claim to be in the IoT
applications[26].
Data Management
The first problem that the developer of IoT needs to consider is the data extraction which
can be regarded as the work on how to collect the data from the appliances and then to extract
useful information from the collected data. Apparently,how data is extracted will have a
strong effect in such environment, especially when the number of appliances are increased to
a certain number. Different from the data extraction issues, the data representation is another
important research topic because the common data representation may be contributory to
information exchange between the IoT system and others, such as ontology and semantic
web technologies[21].
1.3 Taxonomy of Security Concerns in IoT
Internet of Things platform is usually deployed using various communication and design
technologies depends on the needs of the target application. The traditional security threats
related to internet cannot be applied on the IoT. However, it is recommended to propose
dedicated threat models for IoT applications. The degree of heterogeneity present in the IoT
systems is one of the causes for the prevalence of numerous security threats in the target
IoT applications.
Security in IoT system is classified as follows [4].
1. Data Security
2. System Security
1.3.1 Data Security
Sensor networks is a key part of IoT. All the existing IoT devices are most likely tiny and
resource constrained sensor devices which uses wireless communications. An enormous
10
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amount of sensor data is exchanged between the things or devices in a real time IoT scenario
which needs security and privacy. Consider a health care IoT application, the patient’s
information is required to be confidential from the attackers. For this purpose, certain secure
cryptographic algorithms are to be embedded on to the sensor devices. The following are
the security requirements under data security:
a. Data Confidentiality:
Protecting sensor data from the unauthorized users provides confidentiality to the
enormous data communication. Sensitive information of the IoT application like device
passwords, shared encryption keys between sensor device and gateway of the network should
be protected from being stolen by the hackers. Otherwise, once a device is compromised by
stealing its sensitive data, the entire system can be compromised by the attacker. Hence,
Data confidentiality has become an important issue in case of various IoT applications like
health care monitoring, home security system.
b. Data Integrity
Data Integrity holds when the sensor data which is being communicated between various
IoT devices is genuine enough and intact without any unauthorization. This also includes
identity of its content as well as the source of information. This data integrity also depends
on the security provided by the communication protocols being used such as 6LowPAN,
MQTT in IoT applications.
c. Data Availability
In this resource constrained IoT world, several researchers found that it is very much
difficult to ensure the availability of data whenever needed. Hence efforts are being carried
out towards this requirement to avoid operational failures of the devices.
1.3.2 System Security
The security to be enabled in the entire system is equally important as data security. This
includes various aspects like communication, devices and the network topology that is
involved in the design of the system model.
a. Communication Security:
The different layers of IoT layered architecture can be made secure by using various
standard communication mechanisms between the IoT devices. This can be achieved in the
following ways [27]:
1. End to end security between source and destination.
2. Hop to hop security between two neighboring devices.
1.End to end security:
Among the communication protocols, IPsec present in network layer which is in transport
mode provides security in the form of end-to-end basis for the system and satisfies all the
security requirements. This protocol can collaborate with any one of the transport layer
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protocols like TCP, HTTP, CoAP. Besides IPsec, Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) is used which enforces E2E security in various applications on one machine
between the transport and application layers.
2.Hop to Hop security:
The security to be enforced between two adjacent devices is hop-to-hop security. This
is necessary because, in order to ensure security in communication, each node in that
path are to be secure and trusted. There are many ways to implement this category of
security. Message modification can be caught if there is a security check at each hop in
the communication before it reaches the destination. The safety in 6LoWPAN networks is
ensured if this security is incorporated so that it avoids the intruders in the radio medium
wasting the system resources [5].
b. Network Security:
Apart from the communication security, there is a necessity to avoid the attackers with
an aim to interfere in the availability of the network devices. The measures to be taken
should be able to prevent the interruptions such as disrupting the topology with DOS attacks.
Primarily, besides firewalls, an intrusion detection system is always recommended to find
the intruders and their activities in the network. In addition, constant monitoring of the
network by an administrator is also an important step to avoid any breach inside the network.
c. Device Security:
The addressing scheme for the devices in IoT has been one of the challenges that is
constantly driving the researchers. By using IPv6 in the ever growing IoT, problems will
still persist as the statistics state that the wireless IoT devices can touch 40 billion in the next
decade[11]. Hence, Security at both the network as well as device levels is critical to the
operation of IoT. One of the most popular application is the wearables category. There is a
high chance for the hackers to attack the devices like smart watch by using the integrated
motion sensor inside the watch and fabricate the critical information. Hence its high time to
provide device security to prevent such ghastly attacks in IoT.
Out of which the following are the major security concerns in the context of IoT[28]:
• Authentication
• Identity Management
• User privacy
• Confidentiality
• Data Protection
• Access control and device authorization
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Authentication
Lack of authentication in any network is a threat to entire system. Authentication can
be the basic criteria for any user or device to get an access to the network resources. In IoT,
authentication should be made as mandatory for all the devices that communicate with each
other. Otherwise, the hackers can get hold of the devices which can evidently pose a threat
to the network.
Identity Management
As the number of devices are roaring up high, the job of providing them unique IP
addresses is also going on the tough side. Hence there is a need for efficient identity
management without which the devices cannot be connected to each other via internet.
User Privacy
The details of the sensor devices present in the system should always be kept confidential.
That means the privacy plays an important role in case of IoT. Privacy involves managing
the critical data, reducing the probability of the attacks by using user anonymity.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to the concept of hiding the crucial data from the attackers. The
loads of data collected by the sensors in most of the applications like health care, home
security system etc. should not go into the wrong hands which can be a threat to the user.
Data Protection
The huge amount of data generated by the devices is supposed to be under protection
and should be well managed by the users. If the system lacks proper data management and
protection, there is a chance of loss in the data or modification of the data by the attackers.
Therefore, this is one of the security concerns in case of IoT.
Access Control and Device Authorization
Access control refers to the way the devices or users are provided with the access rights
as supposed to which resources can be accessed by them. If this is not properly maintained,
then even a hacker can gain access to critical resources which can be a great loss to the entire
system. Further, device authorization is similar to authentication where the new devices are
supposed to be authorized by the trusted entity before they gain access to the confidential
resources of the network.
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1.4 Authentication in IoT
To define authentication, we can say that it is a process to identify that only an authorized
user is supposed to get access to the network.
Different ways of authentication are stated below:
1. based on what you know
2. based on what you have
3. based on what you are
Based on what you know
This type of authentication usually uses the values known to the user. For example, the
authentication performed using the personal credentials like password, smart card, pin etc
falls into this category. This type of authentication is prone to certain attacks like smart card
stolen attack, password guessing attack etc.
Based on what you have
When the authentication is performed based on the entity that you possess, then it falls into
this category. All the credit/debit cards, RFID tags, cryptographically secure calculators can
be used as a means to participate in authentication. When
Based on what you are
This type of authentication is based on what the entity is, which means the process is
carried out using the traits of the entity such as the biometric which include hand print, voice
reader, scan of the retina or the signature itself.This is performed by storing the traits of the
entity prior to the process. Afterwards, when he is being authenticated, a comparison is made
between the actual information and the captured information.
However, there are several liabilities such as the cost effectiveness, reliability or the
hacking of entity information while using this method.
The fundamental security approach for the device security in the IoT is to provide
authentication and access control for the devices before the communication. Authenticating
the devices will ensure the unauthorized access by the attackers in the perception layer
of Internet of Things. Secure device authentication is the key requirement for the data
exchange among the devices to take care of device integrity[6].
User authentication:
The entities in an IoT environment include the end customers who will utilize the data
being generated by the devices from the real world. They further produce the results in
the form of reports to analyze them. In order to prevent any attacker to avail this feature
and eavesdrop the data, a mechanism for each and every user authentication is necessary.
Before any user tries to get hold of the network device and modify or erase the data, they
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must be fully authorized by the nearest gateway or base station of the network.
Device authentication:
Device authentication can prevent unauthorized users access to the Internet of things
perception layer nodes and data, the effective protection of perception layer information
security. At present, the main categories in authentication techniques are: authentication
method based on lightweight public key algorithm, based on the pre-shared key
authentication method, random key pre-distribution method of authentication and
authentication method based on one-way hash function[26].
Similarly, different ways of authentication of devices in the perception layer can be
categorized as follows[29]:
1. One way authentication
2. Mutual authentication
One way Authentication
When the communication among the nodes is completed by using only one message
which can provide:
• The sender’s identity to achieve non-repudiation.
• The receiver mentioned in the message is the actual receiver of the message.
• The message is sent as it is without any modifications while the communication takes
place.
Mutual Authentication
The concept of mutual authentication came into existence to confirm that the entities
participating in the communication can perform authentication with each other. When there
is mutual authentication, there is no chance for the attacker to perform any impersonation
attacks in the network. Usually, the sensor devices are authenticated with the base station
and vice-versa to complete mutual authentication.
In the proposed method of our thesis, we used a mutual authentication procedure
using password based method with variations of elliptic curve cryptography to ensure
authentication between IoT devices and gateway.
1.5 Research Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm is potentially gaining much importance day by day.
The underlying elements of IoT are RFIDs, sensors and actuators which are relatively
small in size and consumes less power. Various environments that have the flavor of IoT
include wireless sensor networks, low-energy rate wireless personal area networks. Among
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which the area that draws attention is the wireless sensor networks because of their ease of
deployment in numerous real time applications[3]. Besides the several points of interest
that wireless sensor networks possess like scalability, flexibility towards diverse tough
conditions, they also come across certain issues like constraints on resource’s energy storage
capacity, vulnerability of sensor nodes towards various physical as well as other common
attacks like impersonation, replay attacks[27]. Among the security challenges as defined in
[5] the most important issue to be addressed is the authentication in the network. In a given
environment of sensors, if the network is lacking in authentication property, there is a high
level of certainty that intruders can easily fake themselves as a legitimate user and acquire
critical information of the network[5]. Hence, every new external user or device who is
willing to communicate with other devices present in the network should be verified if it is
a legitimate device.
All the existing authentication schemes [30–32] developed for authentication are quite
successful to certain extent but certain limitations still persist when using those methods.
Based on their performance analysis, it can be deduced that sometimes these methods
causes energy exhaustion of sensor devices and also imposes computational overhead on
the network. In order to overcome such consequences of using complex authentication
protocols, it is recommended to choose a light weight authentication protocol to improve
the performance of sensor devices in the system.
1.6 Problem Statement and Objectives
1. Mutual authentication solution is to be proposed that minimizes the number of
messages to be exchanged during authentication as well as to make it lightweight
which adopts simple operations to minimize the consumption of resources in the
network.
2. To design device authentication protocol for resource constrained sensor networks
which are underlying technology of Internet of Things applications.
3. To evaluate the resistance of the protocols against the known active and passive attacks
in perception layer of IoT.
4. To compute various performance metrics like computation time, communication
overhead of the devised protocol and compare against other existing protocols.
The possible solution can be described as follows:
• The existing asymmetric algorithm solutions are memory as well as time consuming,
we use variants of elliptic curve cryptography approach which provides same security
with less key size,combined with symmetric system(AES) to generate the keys for
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encryption of device credentials in registration and login phases of the protocol
respectively and also to implement verification of device by gateway node to complete
the authentication process.
• To allow secure data collection tasks between sensor device and gateway, session key
agreement is to be performed using the proposed system after the authentication phase
between the gateway and the device(thing).
1.7 Thesis Contribution
The major contributions of the thesis can be described as:
1. A mutual authentication with key agreement protocol is proposed for the devices to
prevent unauthorized access in the network. This is carried out by a symmetric key
negotiation based mechanism in order to perform a lightweight and secure mutual
authentication among the devices.
2. During the symmetric key negotiation phase of the authentication process, there is a
possibility of an intruder can intercept the certificate comprimising the key generation
of the communication between the entities. Hence to improve its security, we further
used an asymmetric key negotiation based mechanism to achieve the security as well
as light weight propoerty in the mutual authentication between the devices.
1.8 Thesis Outline
In this chapter, introduction to Internet of Things, its applications, authentication problem in
the context of IoT, the motivation towards the authentication problem in IoT and objectives
of the research are discussed. The rest of the thesis is divided into the following chapters :
In Chapter 2, we discussed the security issues in perception layer, importance of
authentication in the perception layer, network model, attacker model and performance
metrics used.
Chapter 3 describes the proposed approach i.e.device authentication based on symmetric
key negotiation with elliptic curve cryptography,comparison, results are also discussed.
Chapter 4 describes the proposed approach i.e.device authentication based on symmetric
key negotiation with elliptic curve cryptography,comparison, results are also discussed.
Chapter 5 condenses the results we have acquired and presents a concise summary.
Chapter 6 describes different improvements to further enhance the performance results.
Chapter 2
Authentication in Perception Layer :
Security Issues, Models
2.1 Introduction
Securing perception layer devices of IoT has been a tedious task because of their
heterogeneity nature and properties such as unreliable wireless technologies, resource
constraints of devices which are left in neglected environment[28]. For the security of these
devices, we need to focus on various security properties. These properties can be divided into
two categories- primary and secondary. The primary security properties are authentication,
data availability and confidentiality along with integrity. The second category has properties
such as synchronization of timestamps, data freshness and self-organization of the network.
The importance of the properties varies depending on the application domain of the IoT.
For example, data confidentiality and privacy is important in environmental monitoring.
Authenticity, availability, integrity are crucial in health care domain[20].
IoT devices can be easily exposed to security attacks due to their deployment. Though
the existing solutions for security in traditional networks are huge in number, they cannot
be directly applied to IoT because of the constraints such as memory, resources, energy and
its deployment in an unattended environment. This results in the need for a novel security
schemes that are suitable for IoT in the context of wireless sensor networks as the nodes are
not capable of performing any highly complex operations or storing any enormous data in
them.
2.2 Development of WSN towards IoT
IoT consists of variety of devices with dedicated IP address interconnected globally via
internet. Various IoT applications like healthcare, agriculture applications can be established
by using the wireless sensor networks(WSN) based on the condition that they are able to
connect to the real world devices. These IP-enabled nodes transfers the information to a
central node which performs all the storage, organization of the generated huge sensor data.
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Figure 2.1: Role of WSN in IoT
This is performed by the specific gateways which are also responsible for the data flow
between the devices in IoT environment. However, there arise wide range of challenges
when we perform integration of WSN into IoT which include security issues, quality of
service of the application and configuring the application[33].
2.3 Security Threats in Different Layers of IoT
A security threat is an act where it leverages the security weaknesses of a system and creates
a negative effect on it by degrading the quality of service of the system[34].
Figure 2.2: Attacks in Different Layers of IoT
Various possible attacks in different layers of IoT can be depicted in figure 2.2.
2.3.1 Security Issues in Perception Layer in IoT
Sensing layer is also called as perception layer. This layer is responsible for collecting the
information and gathering the physical parameters of all the devices connected to each other.
Data acquisition and collaboration are themain features of the perception layer. It has various
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sensors namely temperature and humidity sensors, GPS, RFID label, camera, etc. RFID
technology and sensor network technologies are the key technologies employed in this layer.
Dynamic network topology and distributed nature of IoT are one of the causes for security
attacks and threats [35].
The objects which are referred as ‘things’ in the given IoT scenario are connected to
internet and hence can also suffer from various attacks by the attackers. However, various
applications like health care monitoring, smart home, smart grid which incorporate the
concept of Internet of Things are still suffering from plenty of vulnerabilities [2]. Recently,
a study about security vulnerabilities present in IoT devices like garage door opening system
revealed that any potential intruder could gain access to the device which can further lead
to serious consequences like robbery. Hence security for these IoT devices has been driving
the researchers to minimize the vulnerabilities and protect from plenty of attacks.
Attacks in an IoT application can be classified into the following categories [14].
1. Passive Attacks
2. Active Attacks
1. Passive Attacks:
In this type of attacks, the attackers are able to eavesdrop the data while it is being
transmitted but cannot modify the data. They try to monitor the data transmission over the
communication channel. Examples of these attacks are sniffing, eavesdropping.
2. Active Attacks:
In this type of attacks, the attackers not only monitors the data but also tries to perform
modification of data,fabrication, interruption. Examples of these attacks are given below.
Several common kinds of attacks in perception layer are as follows[36]:
1. Node Capture: The perception layer devices like sensors, tags etc can be
compromised by the attackers. This might result in the leakage of critical data such as
the shared keys or the credentials of the nodes which can result in adverse effects on
the network.
2. ReplayAttack: The information is sent by the attacker to the receiver to gain the user’s
trust in the system. This is useful in authentication process, to revoke the certification
of the users.
3. Man-in-the-middle Attack: Attacker can intercept the data collection or data
acquisition tasks of the sensor devices and he can try to act as the legitimate user
to acquire the critical data of the network.
4. Impersonation Attack: This is the attack in which the entire node’s identity is being
hacked by the attacker. This will result in sending false data to other nodes in the
network by establishing itself as a valid node.
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5. Denial of Service Attack: Another issue common to both IoT as well as WSN is this
attack. This results in the loss of resources to attack the availability of the network
services.
In order to avoid the percentage of attacks on the devices, authentication should be
implemented in the network. This authentication can be external user authentication and
insider or network device authentication. In a given environment of sensors, if the network
is lacking in authentication property, there is a high level of certainty that intruders can easily
fake themselves as a legitimate device and acquire critical information of the network[5].
Hence, every new device who is willing to communicate with other sensor nodes in the
network should be verified if it is a legitimate device. Hence an authentication method is
required to verify the device identity.
2.4 Related Work
The authentication protocols can be classified based on the type of cryptographic techniques
used as follows:
1. Based on Symmetric Cryptography
2. Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
3. Based on Simple Hash Functions
2.4.1 Based on Symmetric Cryptography
Xue et al. proposed a novel authentication scheme based on temporal credentials along
with key agreement in wireless sensor networks[32]. It manages to establish key between
the user and sensor node after providing the authentication. However, in this method, user
cannot change password freely. It does not restrict privileged insider attack, prone to smart
card security breach attack and there is no provision of identity protection[32]. It also needs
time synchronization to prevent replay attack.
An advanced password based user authentication scheme is devised which is supposed to
be efficient in terms of computation cost than the existing schemes [30, 37, 38].This method
comprises of four phases such as user registration, login, authentication and session key
agreement, changing password which are collectively used in order to authenticate a remote
user [39]. The protocol is then verified using security analysis tool which declares that the
protocol allows only the valid user devices to get access rights to the sensor nodes and also
achieves the authentication process in a mutual way between the gateway,the external user
as well with less computational cost.
A hybrid authentication scheme with key establishment which is based on symmetric
key cryptography and identity based cryptography[40]. Two protocols were proposed for
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authentication and generation of pairwise and group keys for the devices in the wireless
body area networks. They provide the necessary security properties but not proved to be
lightweight enough during the real time implementation.
2.4.2 Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
Jiang et al. used a self-certified cryptosystem(SCK) along with Elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) in a distributed environment to perform user authentication to establish set of key
pairs in sensor networks[41]. The nodes in this model which are present in the radio range
of the user will try to find out if the user has proper access rights to the sensor nodes in the
network. The issue with this method is that when the node receives a request for access from
the user, it has to compute the pairwise keys to share with the user. It is also observed that
the cost at the sensor node increase as it has to encrypt the nonce with ECC[41].
Chatterjee et al. considers wireless body area sensor networks to propose an efficient
access control based method that uses a group-based user authentication method [42]. The
usage of elliptic curve based public key cryptosystem enhances the access control in the
network and provides a session key establishment. Results from formal analysis of the
protocol mentioned that this method is safe against certain passive and active attacks.
A scheme that uses elliptic curve method with lesser key size value is efficient than an
authentication scheme that uses public key method with more key size[42]. Hence this
method is efficient in storage wise as well as communication cost wise than other methods
[30, 37]. Also, man in the middle attacks can be effectively resisted by this method with less
computation complexity making it suitable for energy constrained devices.
Choi et al. proposed a protocol which is an enhancement of [42, 43]. This protocol
uses elliptic curves cryptography for providing authentication for users who are trying to
communicate with the sensors in the network [44]. This protocol provides resistance against
sensor energy exhaustion attack, session key attack without affecting the efficiency of the
protocol. It claims that considering the hash operations as negligible in calculating cost of
protocol, remaining point multiplication operations performed by user, sensor and gateway
node are less when compared to other protocols[42, 43] .
Debaio proposed a new authentication method which is an improved version of Yuan
et al. biometric method [45]. It is an efficient method but costly biometric mechanism is
deployed for providing user authentication. Further, to avoid DOS attack and impersonation
attacks, an individual’s unique identity which is defined by his biometric is being recorded
and is further used in the registration process.
The later phases like login and authentication are also useful to computationally improve
the overall performance of the method. Though this proposed method is computationally
efficient, it suffers a disadvantage from cost perspective.
An ECC-based scheme which provides authentication as well as the attribute-based
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access control were proposed to perform authentication in a mutual fashion between the user
device and the sensor nodes.[46]. The researchers focused on the security of the perception
layer devices. They had considered a third party such as attribute authority (AA) to authorize
the public keys used during authentication. They had followed a clustered approach of
network model to perform authentication. In addition to the authentication, the authors
consider an attribute based mechanism for controlling access rights of the users. However,
this method does not completely assure access control as it needs further improvements.
2.4.3 Based on Simple Hash Functions
A lightweight authentication model based on symmetric cryptographic parameters is
proposed for large scale wireless networks[47]. This method uses keyed and unkeyed
hash functions during the authentication process. It provides resilience against attacks
such as node capture. It provides improvement in energy consumption and scalability over
SPINS[48]. However, this protocol is specifically designed for large scale wireless sensor
networks and hence might not be directly deployed into IoT environment.
Huang et al. proposed a method where a simple xor based encryption function is
designed and used in the three phases of the authentication protocol, thereby yielding less
computational cost [45]. The encryption function is a cover coded function in which the
key is a generated random number and then the corresponding message to be communicated
between user node and gateway node is encrypted using this key. Thus, this method claims
that attacker cannot easily guess the key and intrude into the network.
A.K.Das used a simple hash function to design a robust user authentication schemewhich
claims to be better in terms of communication cost efficiency compared to [37, 49]. This
method uses SHA-2 as a one way hash function for the purpose of providing encryption for
the messages exchanged between the user and Base station, Base station and sensor node
[50]. This method helps in the minimization of operations that are performed so that the
computation cost is reduced. This method provides a key establishment also between user
and sensor node in order to secure the communication channel. However, this method might
suffer from serious attacks if the hash function is not assumed to be a random oracle model
and not resistant to collision attacks [51].
A new protocol for authentication is proposed in [52] which is based on the smart
cards to store the critical data of the user. The author claims that this method is suitable
for constrained networks. It uses hash and exclusive or functions to establish session key
between the entities.
The present methodologies which use magnetic stripe cards, smart cards are also
susceptible to wide range of attacks such as duplicating the card, side channel attacks, power
analysis attacks[53]. In order to execute a challenge-response based authentication protocol,
a new hardware based method was introduced based on Physical Unclonable Function
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(PUF). This is very effective method in terms of the response rate because it can respond
to more than one cryptographic key but in a repeated manner. Each time, a new challenge
response key pair is generated to perform the authentication. This technology has been
applied to smart cards as well in order to counterattack the cloning attacks[54].
The author in [52] proposed a new method for authenticating user in wireless sensor
networks by using the concept of IoT. This method has four phases in which the user is
able to register, login, authenticate and is able to change the password. They claim that this
method is resistant to DoS attacks, replay attacks but there is a security breach because of
smart card. The performance analysis of this method shows that it is suitable for lightweight
environment.
2.4.4 Analysis of Existing Authentication Protocol
The protocol proposed in [55] has two phases for registration and authentication. The
method claims that it is lightweight and secure as they are using symmetric encryption in the
authentication phase. However, in the intial registration phase, the credentials are susceptible
to certain attacks like eavesdropping which can compromise the system.
In the first step of the protocol, the credentials are being sent as cleartext to the base
station allowing the attacker to capture the data and impersonate himself as the valid device.
Then he can calculate the shared secret value using this data. Using this value he can further
calculate the constant value sent in the second message exchange to the user device. This
constant value received by the device from the base station is used in the authentication
phase, hence the step where the shared secret value is being captured by the attacker should
be avoided.
Using which he can also interfere in the authentication phase by generating his own
nonce values as a valid device and sends them to gateway for authentication. Further
enhancements are suggested in the next chapters to this protocol using symmetric key
negotiation and asymmetric key negotiation to avoid such attacks along with ensuring the
lightweight property of the protocol.
Observations
The comparison of security features of the existing protocols that we have studied is
presented in the Table 2.4.4. Most of them support mutual authentication, attack resiliency
along with key agreement. But some of the protocols are not lightweight in nature which
can impose overhead on the sensor devices.
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Protocol MutualAuthentication
Key
Agreement
Replay Attack
Resilience
Impersonation
Attack Resilience
Lightweight
[32] Yes Yes Yes Yes No
[46] Yes Yes No Yes No
[45] No Yes Yes No Yes
[49] Yes Yes No No No
[52] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[56] No No Yes No No
[50] Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Table 2.1: Comparison of Security Features between the related schemes
2.5 Network Model
We assume that there exists two major entities: devices denoted as D and a gateway denoted
as G that connects the devices to the end infrastructure via cloud as shown in the Figure
2.3. The model depicts that the devices chose the gateway to communicate with the remote
servers, other services via cloud. Before they can actually communicate the data that is
collected, the devices are authenticated with the gateway.
Devices are assumed to have following components:
1. It consists of hardware as well as software modules which can sense the data, form
reports, receive queries, and acting accordingly. A communication system to enable
wireless communications (e.g., bluetooth, zigbee) to report data to gateway and a
program to process the data along with a storage space to store relevant data are
available in the device.
2. It consists of software and hardware for identification of credentials and to store secrets
such as keys.
Gateways are assumed to have the following properties:
1. It is an entity with secure public and private keys.
2. It is powerful enough to perform the complex operations unlike sensor device.
We focus on the authentication between the devices and the gateways. Our methods in
the chapters 3,4 are applicable between the sensor devices and the smart gateway as shown
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Figure 2.3: Network Model
in the figure 2.3. The sensor devices can interact with each other only after their successful
authentication with the gateway of the system.
2.6 Intruder Model
The first condition to be considered is that the devices can be subjected to compromise, as
they are mostly found unattended in open environments. we assume a stronger adversary
which helps to provide better security, which is requirement for certain critical applications,
such as health care, home security system, smart grid etc. We assume that the adversary has
the ability to eavesdrop the data, send duplicate data to the devices. It is also assumed that
the credentials are predefined in the device at the manufacturer.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the overview of issues in the perception layer of IoT. We have
also classified the security requirements and the attacks possible in perception layer of IoT.
Then,we have discussed the pros and cons of various existing authentication schemes of
wireless sensor networks which can be extended to our IoT system. The devices in IoT
system are resource constrained like the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor networks, which
needs lightweight computation based authentication methods to avoid energy depletion of
the IoT devices in the perception layer. In the next chapter, we describe a new mutual
device authentication method from security view point, to avoid external attacks during data
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collection by simultaneously taking care of the performance metrics such as computation
overhead, communication overhead as well.
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Chapter 3
Device Authentication using Symmetric
Key Negotiation with ECC
3.1 Introduction
IoT is always an open domain where attackers are continuously trying to hack the devices so
easily. For example,hackers can gain access to the insulin pumps of the patients in case of
health care and they can send false data to the hospital management. Then the staff might give
false medication to the patient assuming that the data has been received from the authorized
device. Hence, Authentication is one of the important security requirements for IoT devices
in the perception layer of Internet of Things. However, the characteristics of the devices in
the perception layer such as unattended and resource constrained nature sets the need for a
secure yet lightweight authenticationmechanism. Various purely symmetric and asymmetric
mechanisms deal with the device authentication and access rights of the devices by using
certain additional factors like smart cards, security tokens, PUF’s etc. which produce nearly
impeccable results in terms of security but causing overhead simultaneously. The principal
factors to be considered while designing the protocols for the devices in IoT is to balance
both security and overhead.
In this chapter, the authentication scheme initiates registration using an elliptic curve
diffie-hellman protocol for creating a symmetric key negotiation to exchange the credentials
of the device securely with the gateway. Symmetric key negotiation takes place using the
ECDH protocol where both the entities exchange their public keys to arrive at a common
shared symmetric key. Then it is followed by authentication where a key establishment is
also performed after successfully authenticating the device. This key is further used by the
devices to communicate with the gateway during data collection tasks.
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3.2 Proposed Method
3.2.1 Goals
The aim of the protocol is to achieve device authentication and secure key establishment
with the common key to be used in the next stage of communication between the devices.
Besides, there are other security goals to be achieved such as the resistance against the
perception layer attacks such as impersonation attack, replay attacks while preserving the
integrity,availability.
3.2.2 Assumptions
• It is assumed that the attacker is able to eavesdrop the messages between the two
entities.
• The attacker can impersonate any one of the entities.
• The secrets which are pre-defined inside both the devices are safe from the attacker.
3.2.3 Protocol Definition
The protocol consists of two participants - IoT device and gateway/base station. The
notations used in the proposed method are given in the Table 3.2.3. The proposed method
performs authentication in two phases described as follows.
1. Device Registration
2. Device Authentication
Preliminaries of Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellmann(ECDH)
When the Diffie-Hellman protocol is added the flavor of elliptic curves, a key agreement
protocol called Elliptic CurveDiffie-Hellman is evolved. Themain function of thismethod is
to ensure the two entities generate their own key pairs. Then agree to a common secret which
is generated by exchanging the key pairs over the communication channel. This channel can
be any insecure one which is an added advantage to the users of the public medium in the
communication. The combination of the elliptic curve cryptography which is an asymmetric
system with the symmetric diffie-hellman resulted in this method. The final shared key is
used for encryption between the two parties as how it is used in traditional diffie-hellman
algorithm. This key can also be used to produce another key as per the constraints.
The parameters which are used to calculate the key pairs are basically a very long prime
number p along with another integer g with a condition g < p. Firstly, these details are
exchanged by both the parties over in an insecure medium. Then they choose their own
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Symbol Meaning
v Secret Value of the system
k Concatenation
Nd Random nonce of the device
 Exclusive OR
Ng Random nonce of the gateway
Dk Shared key generated using Diffie-Hellman
H(.) One-way hash Function
E(M;K) Encryption function of M with key K
Table 3.1: Notations
private integers a , b which are called private key of them. Further, they use the received
parameters and their private key to generate their own public keys. The common key
generated by both parties will match but not their private keys. The commonly shared key
in this case would be gamodp for the user A and gbmodp for the user B.
The secret key is calculated from their private keys. Thus if an eavesdropper captures
the values p; g , he cannot find the secret key with the knowledge of only their public keys.
Hence, this protocol is said to be secure until the attacker is not able to solve the hardest
Elliptic curve discrete logarithmic issue. The usage of shorter keys in case of this method
fetches the same level of security as RSA which uses larger keys. This is because of the
elliptic curves used in this system.
Device Registration
In this phase, the IoT device and the gateway are initialized with the required predefined
security parameters. When the new device enters the network, it is first registered at the
gateway before performing any data collection functions. A secret value v is generated
by the intermediate gateway in order to perform authentication and registration of the new
devices. Every new device performs this registration phase before it tries to communicate
with the other devices of the network. This phase starts with the exchange of device identity
and password with the gateway.
Firstly, the device and the gateway will undergo the process of key negotiation using
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) to securely transfer the device credentials to the
gateway as shown in the Figure 3.1. A symmetric key is established between the two entities
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to complete the registration phase. This helps to avoid any eavesdropping by the attackers
while transferring the device credentials.
Figure 3.1: Device Registration Phase
The following steps are followed accordingly by both device and gateway in order to
complete the registration phase as described in the below algorithm 3.1.
Step 1: The device encrypts its credentials i.e., identity (id) and password (pwd) with the
available shared symmetric key Dk generated using the symmetric key negotiation before
sending it to gateway.
Algorithm 3.1 Device Registration Phase
1: D ! G : Sends Id and EPuk(pwd), Password pwd encrypted with Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman symmetric key Dk
2: G : Decrypts the message to find the password pwd and Computes the shared secret
value SK = H (Id k V ), P = SK  pwd
3: G! D : Sends P
Step 2: The gateway then decrypts the arrived encrypted message with its own
symmetric key (Dk) and computes the following: i ) Secret key SK= H(id k v) where k
is concatenation operation ,H is a one-way hash function. ii) a new value P = pwd  SK
where is exclusive or operation. Then this new value P is registered with the device which
is later used by it in the authentication stage of the device.
Device Authentication
In order to communicate with other devices and perform its tasks securely, a device needs
to login and authenticate with the gateway of the network. After successfully being registered
at the gateway, the device will go through the authentication process when it tries to acquire
access to the other devices as shown in Figure 3.2.
This process is carried out using the p value stored in the registration part of the device.
Only three message exchanges takes place to ensure the successful operation. This helps to
scale down the consumption of resources of the device. If the device is unable to produce
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the same values as exchanged in the previous registration stage, then the process termination
will takes place.
Figure 3.2: Device Authentication Phase
The process is started by following steps which are carried out as follows :
Step 1 : The device starts this phase by computing the secret key SK by using the
registered P value and its password (pwd) as SK = P  pwd. Then it generates a nonceNd
which is a random number and sends the messageM1 = id; (Nd)SK to gateway which has
device id and encrypted value of the random numberNd using advanced encryption standard
(AES) symmetric key encryption with the secret key SK. This AES encryption is useful in
low-rate personal area networks which contain battery operated devices.
Step 2 : After the gateway receives messageM1, the gateway computes the necessary
values SK which is calculated by SK = H(idkv). Further, the gateway also decrypts the
received message M1 using this calculated secret key SK for the device’s random valueNd.
Then the gateway also generates his own challenge by generating his own random number
Ng.
Using the secret key SK, gateway sends an encrypted messageM2 = (NdkNg)SK to the
device.
Step 3 : After the arrival of the message M2 from the gateway, the device starts
decrypting the message using the secret key SK to find the nonce values Nd,Ng. After
further verification of both the sent and received Nd, the device then calculates the session
key K = Nd  Ng . This ensures the authenticity of the gateway with the device if the
verification is successful.
32
Chapter 3 Device Authentication using Symmetric Key Negotiation with ECC
Then the received Ng value is encrypted using this keyK and then sent as messageM3
to the gateway.
Step 4 : When the message arrives, the gateway immediately computes the key K =
Nd  Ng and decrypts the message using this session key. The decrypted message Ng is
then verified by the gateway with its own Ng. This will complete the authentication of the
device with the gateway if the verification is successful. Otherwise the communication is
terminated with the device.
The session key K, which is established during the authentication stage can be used
by the device and gateway during the data management tasks like data collection and data
acquisition or any other task performed by the device.
Algorithm 3.2 Device Authentication Phase
1: D : Generates random number Nd, Computes SK
0
= P  pwd
2: D ! G : MessageM1 = Id; ESK0 (Nd)
3: G : ComputesSK = h(Idkv) ,N 0d by decryptingESK0 (Nd)withSK, generates random
number Ng
4: G! D : MessageM2 = ESK(N 0dkNg)
5: D : recovers N 0d , N
0
g by decrypting M2 using SK
0 , verifies Nd = N
0
g and computes
session key K = Nd N 0g
6: D ! G : MessageM3 = ESK0 (N 0g)
7: G : recoversN 0g by decryptingM3 using SK and verifiesNg = N
0
g , Computes session
keyK = N 0d Ng
The above algorithm describes the authentication phase of the device with the gateway
where a nonce Nd is generated by the device to compute the shared key value and sends the
message M1 to gateway. Then the gateway also generates Ng and sends message M2 to
the device. Further, both of them verify the integrity of the received nonces and generate a
session key if the authentication of the device is successful.
3.3 Security Analysis
The protocol is said to be secure if it is able to resist against external active and passive
attacks. In this protocol, the secret value v is to be kept safe which provides the necessary
security to the system. This value is generated as a complex random value in order to avoid
any brute force attack to guess it which is not desirable. The proposed protocol is said to be
secure against the following list of attacks.
1. Impersonation Attack :
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Impersonation attack is said to be present if the attacker is able to compromise the device
or the gateway during the communication. This is not possible in both the stages because the
key SK is unknown to the attacker and it is not possible to be revealed at any point. Hence
it is difficult for the intruder to find the nonce values from the captured messages M2 and
generate the messageM3. Hence he cannot complete his authentication process.
2. Replay Attack :
Replay attack occurs when the attacker tries to capture the message over the
communication channel and uses the same message to prove his identity. This is not possible
in the authentication stage of the protocol because if the attacker tries to capture themessages,
he cannot evaluate the same new nonce value Ng or Nd from the intercepted messages.
3. ECDH limitation
The ECDH key exchange protocol used in the device registration is said to be prone
to man in the middle attack. This disadvantage is because of the static keys used in the
schemewhich can be predictable at times and also it lacks pre-verification of the entities. The
attacker can eavesdrop the data when the keys are exchanged to produce a shared symmetric
secret for the encryption of the device credentials as shown in the Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Man-in-the-middle Attack in ECDH
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Thus the protocol is not resilient to man-in-the-middle attack which is a possible attack
in the first step of device registration stage because of the implementation of Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem. Hence, an improvement is necessary in this phase to avoid
this attack and improve the security of the protocol.
The protocol not only provides resistance to above attacks but also provides the following
security requirements.
1. Mutual Authentication
There is a need for mutual authentication in order to ensure the authenticity of both user
devices as well as the sink node or gateway. This protocol ensures this mutual authentication
by the nonces(Nd; Ng) generated by both the entities of the communication. This also helps
to prevent any chances of impersonating the sink node or gateway as there is a possibility
that the attacker might impersonate the gateway or sink node in order to send the fake data
to user devices. Therefore, mutual authentication ensures the authenticity of the sources that
are generating data during communication.
2. Session key Agreement
The last step of this protocol is to establish a secret keyK = NdNg between the device
and the gateway/sink node. The generated session key is useful further in the communication
among the devices i.e.,the device and the gateway/sink node or any two devices.
3.4 Simulation Analysis
The Contiki operating system is a C based OS designed for embedded systems lightweight
and capable of multitasking. It is highly memory efficient and open source, allowing
custom modifications and improvements from a wide community. It is capable of dynamic
application loading and unloading capabilities for services and applications. This gives it
numerous advantages in terms of resource utilization and allows a highly efficient kernel
driven architecture for sensor networks. This makes it an ideal operating system for
implementation of our scheme of secure authentication using symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography techniques.
The proposed protocol is implemented for the Contiki environment using the Java
programming language. In order to implement the device registration phase of the
protocol, cryptographic provider libraries such as FlexiProvider and bouncy castle are used.
Similarly to implement the authentication phase of the protocol, we used the AES protocol
implementation provided in the bouncy castle library.
It is then simulated in Cooja simulator under Contiki OS environment. For the
simulation, we loaded the programming code of IoT device process on one mote and code
of gateway process on the second mote and recorded the execution time of the interaction of
both the phases of the protocol .
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Operating Languages Memory Event Based
System Supported Required(Kb) Programming
TinyOS nesC 1 Yes
Contiki C,Java 2 Yes
LiteOS C 4 Yes
RiotOS C/C++ 1.5 No
Table 3.2: Operating Systems Mostly Used in IoT Environment
3.4.1 Performance Metrics
Metrics are a measure for calculating and estimating the effectiveness of the protocols. The
factors which are used to measure the lightweight property of the protocol are mentioned
below. This protocol is evaluated using the following performance metrics :
1. Computation Cost
2. Communication Cost
3. Execution Time
1. Computation Cost
The constrains of IoT resource-limited devices have been taken into account while
designing the protocol, hence, all the operations employed in our protocol are simple and
lightweight as a complaint with this requirement. This is the combination of time taken by
all the operations carried out in the protocol.
TH : the execution time of a one-way hash function
TMUL: the execution time for an ECC point multiplication
TD_ENC :time required to execute the Diffie-Hellman key encryption.
TENC :time required to execute the symmetric key encryption.
TDEC :time required to execute the symmetric key encryption.
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Protocol Computation cost
Proposed Protocol 1TMUL + 1TD_ENC + 2TENC + TDEC
Choi et al. [44] 4TH + 3TMUL
Chatterjee et al. [42] 3TH + 2TMUL + 3TDEC
Table 3.3: Comparison of Computation Cost at device
2.Communication Cost
Communication costs refer to the number of the messages exchanged between the
Claimer and the Verifier during the authentication process and also the size of each message
in bytes.
Protocol Communication cost
Proposed Protocol 3 messages
Choi et al. [44] 6 messages
Chatterjee et al. [42] 6 messages
Table 3.4: Comparison of Communication Cost of Protocol
3. Execution Time
This metric can be defined as the time taken for the successful completion of the
protocol.
Total Execution Time(in seconds) = TReg + TAuth
TReg : Time to execute registration phase of protocol
TAuth : Time to execute authentication phase of protocol
The registration stage takes 0.278s to execute as we have used ECDH. The authentication
process is executed in 0.211s. Hence the total time for the execution of the protocol is 0.489s
as shown in table 3.4.1.
3.5 Conclusion
A mutual authentication protocol using symmetric design for the unattended devices of
perception layer of IoT is discussed. This device authentication protocol can address
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Protocol Execution Time(s)
Proposed Protocol 0.489s
Choi et al. [44] 2.102s
Chatterjee et al. [42] 6.018s
Table 3.5: Comparison of Execution Time with Different Protocols
the problems of the former schemes and provide better security and slims down the cost
overhead. This scheme allows the device as well as the sink/gateway to authenticate with
each other thus preventing impersonation and replay attacks. After successful authentication,
secure data collection tasks can be performed by the devices with the help of the calculated
session key between them. However, there persist the man-in-the-middle attack in the
registration phase of the protocol which can be avoided using an asymmetric design which
is discussed in the next chapter.
38
Chapter 4
Device Authentication using Asymmetric
Key Negotiation with ECC
4.1 Introduction
The enormously evolving ubiquitous and resource constrained devices have generated the
urge to enhance the levels of security as well as improve the numbers of the performance
parameters of their protocols. The protocols designed for different layers of IoT satisfy
different set of security requirements. Further, the effect of attackers can be avoided by
using asymmetric key cryptography rather than symmetric key cryptography. The difference
between both of them is that in case of symmetric key cryptography, better performance is
observed with possibility of attacks. Because symmetric key cryptosystem uses an identical
private key to encrypt and decrypt messages. The private key consists of numbers, words
and billions of character strings. In this cryptosystem, both a message sender and a message
receiver shares an identical private key for encryption and decryption. Once the private key
is stolen or unintentionally disclosed, anyone can decrypt the encrypted message. While in
case of asymmetric key cryptography, a trade-off between security and performance of the
protocols can be observed.
The proposed method in previous chapter is based on the ECDH where the keys are
generated by the device and gateway prior to the communication. Such keys are not
ephemeral type and hence they are called static keys. These keys that are generated each
time separately are called ephemeral keys. For this purpose, one needs to trust the public
keys of both the key pairs to utilize them in further authentication. In order to avoid the
attacks caused by this static nature of these keys, we propose a solution for this problem
by using an Integrated encryption scheme where the key pair is computed at gateway side
only which results in less computation overhead as the key pair generation is skipped for the
device.
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4.2 Proposed Method
4.2.1 Goals
The aim of the protocol is to achieve device authentication and secure key establishment
with the common key to be used in the next stage of communication between the devices.
Besides, there are other security goals to be achieved such as the resistance against the
perception layer attacks such as impersonation attack, replay attacks while preserving the
integrity,availability.
4.2.2 Assumptions
• It is assumed that the attacker is able to eavesdrop the messages between the two
entities.
• The attacker can impersonate any one of the entities.
• The secrets which are pre-defined inside both the devices are safe from the attacker.
4.2.3 Protocol Definition
The protocol involves two participants - IoT device and gateway/base station. The
proposed method consists of two stages- registration stage with asymmetric key negotiation
, authentication phase with symmetric key establishment.
1. Device Registration
2. Device Authentication
Preliminaries of Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme(ECIES)
ECIES is the integrated encryption scheme based on elliptic curves which is a
combination of public key functions, encryption algorithms with codes for hashing and
authentication. Briefly, this scheme is the generic scenario used to find a set of variants in
encryption schemes. In this scheme, the server will generate its key pairs using a specified
curve. It then sends the public key in a standard encoding format such as X.509 or ANSI
X9.63 to the client. On the client side, the protocol uses the public key from the server
to generate the secret information like secret MACs and key material necessary for the
encryption process. Finally it sends the encrypted cryptogram to the server where the server
can use its private key to recover the cleartext from the cryptogram.
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Symbol Meaning
v Secret Value of the system
k Concatenation
id id of the device
pwd password of the device
Nd Random nonce of the device
 Exclusive OR
Ng Random nonce of the gateway
H(.) One-way hash Function
PUk Public Key of the gateway generated using ECIES
PRk Private Key of the gateway generated using ECIES
E(M,K) Encryption function of M with key K
D(M,K) Decryption function of M with key K
Table 4.1: Notations
Device Registration
In this phase, the IoT device and the gateway are initialized with the required predefined
security parameters. When the new device enters the network, it is first registered at the
gateway before performing any data collection functions as shown in Figure 4.1. A secret
value v is generated by the intermediate gateway in order to perform authentication and
registration of the new devices. Every new device performs this registration phase before
it tries to communicate with the other devices of the network. This phase starts with the
exchange of device id and password with the gateway. The following steps are followed
accordingly by both device and gateway in order to complete the registration phase as shown
in figure 4.1.
Step 1: The device encrypts its credentials i.e., identity (id) and password (pwd) with
the available public key of the gateway(PUk) before sending it to gateway.
Step 2: The gateway then decrypts the arrived encrypted message with its own private
key (PRk) and computes the following: i ) Secret key SK=H(id k v) where k is concatenation
operation ,H is a one-way hash function. ii) a new value P = pwd SK where is exclusive
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Figure 4.1: Registration Phase
or operation. Then this new value P is registered with the device which is later used by it in
the authentication stage of the device.
Algorithm 4.1 Device Registration Phase.
1: D ! G : sends Id and EPuk(pwd), Password pwd encrypted with public key Puk of
gateway.
2: G : Computes the shared secret value SK = H (Id k V ), P = SK  pwd
3: G! D : sends P
In the above algorithm 4.1, after the asymmetric key negotiation, the device acquires the
public key of the gateway to send its encrypted credentials. After decrypting the message
to get the password, the gateway calculates the value of P using the device credentials and
sends it to the device which completes the registration phase.
Device Authentication
In order to communicate with other devices and perform its tasks securely, a device needs
to login and authenticate with the gateway of the network.
The process is started by following steps which are carried out as follows :
step 1 : The device starts this phase by computing the secret key SK by using the
registered P value and its password (pwd) as SK = P  pwd. Then it generates a nonce
Nd which is a random number and sends the messageM1 = id; (Nd)SK to gateway which
has device id and encrypted value of the random number Nd using AES symmetric key
encryption with the secret key SK. This AES encryption is useful in low-rate personal area
networks which contain battery operated devices.
Step 2 : After the gateway receives message M1, the gateway computes the necessary
values SK which is calculated by SK = H(idkv). Further, the gateway also decrypts the
received messageM1 using this calculated secret key SK for the device’s random valueNd.
Then the gateway also generates his own challenge by generating his own random number
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Figure 4.2: Authentication Phase
Ng.
Using the secret key SK, gateway sends an encrypted message M2 = (NdkNg)SK to
the device.
Step 3 : After the arrival of the message M2 from the gateway, the device starts
decrypting the message using the secret key SK to find the nonce values Ng; Ng. After
further verification of both the sent and received Nd, the device then calculates the session
key K = Nd  Ng . This ensures the authenticity of the gateway with the device if the
verification is successful.
Then the received Ng value is encrypted using this key K and then sent as messageM3
to the gateway.
Step 4 : When the message arrives, the gateway immediately computes the key K =
Nd  Ng and decrypts the message using this session key. The decrypted message Ng is
then verified by the gateway with its own Ng. This will complete the authentication of the
device with the gateway if the verification is successful. Otherwise the communication is
terminated with the device.
The session key K, which is established during the authentication stage can be used
by the device and gateway during the data management tasks like data collection and data
acquisition or any other task performed by the device.
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Algorithm 4.2 Device Authentication Phase
1: D : Generates random number Nd, Computes SK
0
= P  pwd
2: D ! G : MessageM1 = Id; ESK0 (Nd)
3: G : ComputesSK = h(Idkv) ,N 0d by decryptingESK0 (Nd)withSK, generates random
number Ng
4: G! D : MessageM2 = ESK(N 0dkNg)
5: D : recovers N 0d , N
0
g by decrypting M2 using SK
0 , verifies Nd = N
0
g and computes
session key K = Nd N 0g
6: D ! G : MessageM3 = ESK0 (N 0g)
7: G : recoversN 0g by decryptingM3 using SK and verifiesNg = N
0
g , Computes session
keyK = N 0d Ng
In the above algorithm 4.2, the authentication process of the device is carried out with the
gateway in a mutual fashion. Both the entities exchange the encrypted one time generated
nonce values with each other by using a symmetric key system. If the received nonce values
are valid, then the authentication is said to be performed successfully.
4.3 Security Analysis
The protocol is said to be secure if it is able to resist against external active and passive
attacks. In this protocol, the secret value v is to be kept safe which provides the necessary
security to the system. This value is generated as a complex random value in order to avoid
any brute force attack to guess it which is not desirable. The proposed protocol is said to be
secure against the following list of attacks.
1. Impersonation Attack : Impersonation attack is said to be present if the attacker is able
to compromise the device or the gateway during the communication. This is not possible in
both the stages because the key SK is unknown to the attacker and it is not possible to be
revealed at any point. Hence it is difficult for the intruder to find the nonce values from the
captured messagesM2 and generate the messageM3. Hence, the intruder cannot complete
his authentication process.
2. Replay Attack : Replay attack occurs when the attacker tries to capture the message
over the communication channel and uses the same message to prove his identity. This is
not possible in the authentication stage of the protocol because when the attacker tries to
capture the messages, he cannot evaluate the same new nonce value Ng or Nd each time
from the corresponding messages.
3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack : This attack usually occurs when an outsider is able to
capture the information and attempts to change the communication between sender and
receiver.
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As we have incorporated the asymmetric key negotiation using Elliptic Curve Identity
Encryption Scheme(ECIES) in the beginning phase of the protocol, it is not so easy for the
attacker to perform this attack.
The protocol not only provides resistance to above attacks but also provides the following
security requirements.
1. Mutual Authentication
There is a need for mutual authentication inorder to ensure the authenticity of both user
devices as well as the sink node or gateway. This protocol ensures this mutual authentication
by the nonces(Nd; Ng) generated by both the entities of the communication. This also helps
to prevent any chances of impersonating the sink node or gateway as there is a possibility
that the attacker might impersonate the gateway or sink node in order to send the fake data
to user devices. Therefore, mutual authentication ensures the authenticity of the sources that
are generating data during communication.
2. Session key agreement
The last step of this protocol is to establish a secret keyK = NdNg between the device
and the gateway/sink node. The generated session key is useful further in the communication
among the devices i.e.,the device and the gateway/sink node or any two devices.
4.4 Simulation Analysis
The Contiki operating system is a C based OS designed for embedded systems lightweight
and capable of multitasking. It is highly memory efficient and open source, allowing
custom modifications and improvements from a wide community. It is capable of dynamic
application loading and unloading capabilities for services and applications. This gives it
numerous advantages in terms of resource utilization and allows a highly efficient kernel
driven architecture for sensor networks. This makes it an ideal operating system for
implementation of our scheme of secure authentication using symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography techniques.
The proposed protocol is implemented for the Contiki environment using the Java
programming language. In order to implement the device registration phase of the protocol,
cryptographic provider libraries such as FlexiProvider and bouncy castle are used to
implement Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). Similarly to implement
the authentication phase of the protocol, we used the AES protocol implementation provided
in the bouncy castle library.
It is then simulated in Cooja simulator under Contiki OS environment. For the
simulation, we loaded the programming code of IoT device process on one mote and code
of gateway process on the second mote and recorded the execution time of the interaction of
both the phases of the protocol .
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4.4.1 Performance Metrics
This protocol is evaluated using the following performance metrics :
1. Computation Cost
The constrains of IoT resource-limited devices have been taken into account while
designing the protocol, hence, all the operations employed in our protocol are simple and
lightweight as a complaint with this requirement.
TH : the execution time of a one-way hash function
TMUL: The execution time for an ECC point multiplication
Tsign: The execution time for generating signature.
TENC : Time required to execute the symmetric key encryption.
TPU_ENC : Time required to execute the Public key encryption.
TDEC : Time required to execute the symmetric key decryption.
Protocol Computation cost
Proposed Protocol TPU_ENC + 2TENC + TDEC
Zhao’s Protocol [57] 2TH + 3TMUL + Tsign
Chatterjee’s Protocol [42] 3TH + 2TMUL + 3TDEC
Table 4.2: Comparison of Computation Cost at device
2.Communication Cost
Communication costs refer to the number of the messages exchanged between the
Claimer and the Verifier and also the size of each message in bytes.
Protocol Communication cost
Proposed Protocol 3 messages
Zhao’s Protocol [57] 5 messages
Chatterjee’s Protocol [42] 6 messages
Table 4.3: Comparison of Communication Cost of Protocol
3. Execution Time
This metric can be defined as the time taken for the successful completion of the protocol.
Total Execution Time(in seconds) = TReg + TAuth
46
Chapter 4 Device Authentication using Asymmetric Key Negotiation with ECC
TReg : Time to execute registration phase of protocol
TAuth : Time to execute authentication phase of protocol
The registration stage takes 107ms to execute as we have used ECIES. The authentication
process is executed in 211ms. Hence the total time for the execution of the protocol is 378ms.
Protocol Execution Time(s)
Proposed Protocol 0.378s
Zhao’s Protocol [57] 4.807s
Chatterjee’s Protocol [42] 6.018s
Table 4.4: Comparison of Execution Time with Different Protocols
4.5 Case Study
The proposed protocols can likely be deployed in the following scenario of wireless body
area network which is also one of the technologies that incorporates IoT.
Figure 4.3: Deployment Scenario
The patient’s sensor will communicate with the health care staff via the gateway as shown
in Figure 4.3. When there is any alert given by the patient’s device to the health care staff
for any emergency, the medication details are immediately communicated to him. But if the
attacker gains access to the patient’s device, he can send false alerts to the staff resulting in
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the false medication provided to the patient which is a deadly risk for the patient. Hence,
an authentication mechanism should be incorporated between the patient’s device and the
gateway before it communicates with the staff. Similarly, the staff’s device should also be
authenticated before they send any medication information to the patients.
Our assumed device in the proposed protocol can be patient’s device or staff device and
the gateway in our protocol is the server shown the Figure 4.3. After the authentication is
performed, using the session key both the entities can exchange valid information with each
other with less computation cost as our protocols are supposed to be lightweight in nature.
4.6 Conclusion
A mutual authentication protocol using asymmetric design for the unattended devices of
perception layer of IoT is elaborated. This device authentication protocol can address the
problems of the former schemes as well as the scheme which was discussed in previous
chapter in terms of security and cost overhead. This mutual authentication scheme prevents
impersonation and replay attacks as well as man-in-the-middle attacks. After successful
authentication, secure data collection and acquisition tasks as applicable to the perception
layer can be performed by the devices, by using the established secret session key between
the device and the gateway of the system. The simulation analysis reveals that the
proposed system performs better in terms of the three performance metrics considered
such as execution time, computation cost, communication cost. This method requires
only 3 message exchanges for completing the authentication process in 0.378s with simple
symmetric encryption and XOR functions.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In thesis, wemainly focused on the security challenges of IoT. we then addressed the problem
of authentication in perception layer of IoT. We observed that the existing authentication
methods are still subjected to attacks and some of them produce overhead at the device.
Hence, in the chapter 3, we proposed a symmetric key negotiation based authentication
mechanism which uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman in the registration phase and a
symmetric key establishment is performed at the end of authentication phase of the protocol.
This key is then used between the devices for data collection tasks. We can observe that
mutual authentication is achieved. Based on the performance analysis, the proposed method
is also lightweight compared to the existing methods due to the smaller key size used by the
ECC cryptography. But in security analysis, we observed that the protocol can be subjected
to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Hence,in the chapter 4,we proposed an asymmetric key negotiation based authentication
mechanismwhich uses Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme in the registration phase
and a symmetric key establishment is performed at the end of authentication phase of the
protocol. This key can be used between the devices for data collection tasks. We can observe
that mutual authentication is achieved in this method. Based on the performance analysis, the
proposed method is also lightweight compared to the existing methods but we can observe
a tradeoff between security and lightweight factor.
Further, it is recommended to put efforts in this direction to improve these methods
with certain level of standards which aims at light weight nature and security within the
IoT infrastructure.
Chapter 6
Future Work
In thesis, authentication for perception layer sensor devices is performed using symmetric
and asymmetric key negotiation in the registration phase of the device. Informal security
analysis is also performed against various active and passive attacks such as impersonation,
replay, man-in-the-middle attacks. Mutual Authentication using password based method
in the proposed protocol can be further enhanced by using methods that will not involve
password of the device to avoid device stolen attacks.
In the process of simulating the protocol in Cooja simulator, we considered only cooja
motes to emulate the protocol. In future work, different motes like skymote, zolertia etc
can be used as test beds and also the protocol is supposed to be implemented in the real
hardware.
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